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A vast amount of valuable data is produced and is becoming available for analysis as a result
of advancements in smart cyber-physical systems. The data comes from various sources, such as
healthcare, smart homes, smart vehicles, and often includes private, potentially sensitive information
that needs appropriate sanitization before being released for analysis. The incremental and fast nature
of data generation in these systems necessitates scalable privacy-preserving mechanisms with high
privacy and utility. However, privacy preservation often comes at the expense of data utility. We
propose a new data perturbation algorithm, SEAL (Secure and Efficient data perturbation Algorithm
utilizing Local differential privacy), based on Chebyshev interpolation and Laplacian noise, which
provides a good balance between privacy and utility with high efficiency and scalability. Empirical
comparisons with existing privacy-preserving algorithms show that SEAL excels in execution speed,
scalability, accuracy, and attack resistance. SEAL provides flexibility in choosing the best possible
privacy parameters, such as the amount of added noise, which can be tailored to the domain and
dataset.
Keywords: Privacy, privacy-preserving data mining, data streams, smart cyber-physical systems,
Internet of Things (IoT), Web of Things (WoT), sensor data streams, big data.
1. Introduction
Smart cyber-physical systems (SCPS) such as smart vehicles, smart grid, smart healthcare systems,
and smart homes are becoming widely popular due to massive technological advancements in the past
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few years. These systems often interact with the environment to collect data mainly for analysis,
e.g. to allow life activities to be more intelligent, efficient, and reliable [1]. Such data often includes
sensitive details, but sharing confidential information with third parties can lead to a privacy breach.
From our perspective, privacy can be considered as “Controlled Information Release” [2]. We can
define a privacy breach as the release of private/confidential information to an untrusted environment.
However, sharing the data with external parties may be necessary for data analysis, such as data mining
and machine learning. Smart cyber-physical systems must have the ability to share information while
limiting the disclosure of private information to third parties. Privacy-preserving data sharing and
privacy-preserving data mining face significant challenges because of the size of the data and the speed
at which data are produced. Robust, scalable, and efficient solutions are needed to preserve the privacy
of big data and data streams generated by SCPS [3, 4]. Various solutions for privacy-preserving data
mining (PPDM) have been proposed for data sanitization; they aim to ensure confidentiality and
privacy of data during data mining [5, 6, 7, 8].
The two main approaches of PPDM are data perturbation [9, 10] and encryption [11, 12]. Although
encryption provides a strong notion of security, due to its high computation complexity [13] it can be
impractical for PPDM of SCPS-generated big data and data streams. Data perturbation, on the
other hand, applies certain modifications such as randomization and noise addition to the original
data to preserve privacy [14]. These modification techniques are less complex than cryptographic
mechanisms [15]. Data perturbation mechanisms such as noise addition [16] and randomization [17]
provide efficient solutions towards PPDM. However, the utility of perturbed data cannot be 100%
as data perturbation applies modifications to the original data, and the ability to infer knowledge
from the perturbed data can result in a certain level of privacy leak as well. A privacy model [18]
describes the limitations to the utility and privacy of a perturbation mechanism. Examples of such
earlier privacy models include k − anonymity [19, 20] and l − diversity [21]. However, it has been
shown that older privacy models are defenseless against certain types of attacks, such as minimality
attacks [22], composition attacks [23] and foreground knowledge [24] attacks. Differential privacy (DP)
is a privacy model that provides a robust solution to these issues by rendering maximum privacy via
minimizing the chance of private data leak [25, 26, 27, 28]. Nevertheless, current DP mechanisms fail
for small databases and have limitations on implementing efficient solutions for data streams and big
data. When the database is small, the utility of DP mechanisms diminishes due to insufficient data
being available for a reasonable estimation of statistics [29]. At the other end of the scale, when the
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database is very large or continuously growing like in data streams produced by SCPS, the information
leak of DP mechanisms is high due to the availability of too much information [30]. Most perturbation
mechanisms tend to leak information when the data is high-dimensional, which is a consequence of the
dimensionality curse [31]. Moreover, the significant amount of randomization produced by certain DP
algorithms results in low data utility. Existing perturbation mechanisms often ignore the connection
between utility and privacy, even though improvement of one leads to deterioration of the other [32].
Furthermore, the inability to efficiently process high volumes of data and data streams makes the
existing methods unsuitable for privacy-preservation in smart cyber-physical systems. New approaches
which can appropriately answer the complexities in privacy preservation of SCPS generated data are
needed.
The main contribution of this paper is a robust and efficient privacy-preserving algorithm for
smart cyber-physical systems, which addresses the issues existing perturbation algorithms have. Our
solution, SEAL (Secure and Efficient data perturbation Algorithm utilizing Local differential privacy),
employs polynomial interpolation and notions of differential privacy. SEAL is a linear perturbation
system based on Chebyshev polynomial interpolation, which allows it to work faster than comparable
methods. We used generic datasets retrieved from the UCI data repository1 to evaluate SEAL’s
efficiency, scalability, accuracy, and attack resistance. The results indicate that SEAL performs well
at privacy-preserving data classification of big data and data streams. SEAL outperforms existing
alternative algorithms in efficiency, accuracy, and data privacy, which makes it an excellent solution
for smart system data privacy preservation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of existing related
work. The fundamentals of the proposed method are briefly discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes
the technical details of SEAL. Section 5 presents the experimental settings and provides a comparative
analysis of the performance and security of PABIDOT. The results are discussed in Section 6, and the
paper is concluded in Section 7. Detailed descriptions of the underlying concepts of SEAL are given
in the Appendices.
1https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
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2. Related Work
Smart cyber-physical systems (SCPS) have become an important part of the IT landscape. Often
these systems include IoT devices that allow effective and easy acquisition of data in areas such as
healthcare, smart cities, smart vehicles, and smart homes [1]. Data mining and analysis are among the
primary goals of collecting data from SCPS. The infrastructural extensions of SCPSs have contributed
to the exponential growth in the number of IoT sensors, but security is often overlooked, and the
devices become a source of privacy leak. The security and privacy concerns of big data and data
streams are not entirely new, but require constant attention due to technological advancements of the
environments and the devices used [33]. Confidentiality, authentication, and authorization are just a
few of the concerns [34, 35, 36]. Many studies have raised the importance of privacy and security of
SCPS due to their heavy use of personally identifiable information (PII) [37]. Controlling access via
authentication [38], attribute-based encryption [39], temporal and location-based access control [38]
and employing constraint-based protocols [40] are some examples of improving privacy of SCPS.
In this paper, our primary target is maintaining privacy when sharing and mining data produced
by SCPSs, and the focus is on “controlled information release”. Literature shows different attempts to
impose constraints on data release and analysis in order to preserve privacy [41]. Data encryption and
data perturbation-based solutions have proven to be more viable for privacy-preserving data publishing
and analysis than methods based on authentication and authorization [42]. Some recent examples for
encryption based privacy-preserving approaches for cloud computing include PPM [43], Sca-PBDA [44]
and TDPP [45], which provide scalable privacy-preserving data processing infrastructures. However,
cryptographic mechanisms are less popular in PPDM for “controlled information release” due to the
high computational complexity, hence not suitable for resource-constrained devices. Perturbing the in-
stances of the original data by introducing noise or randomization is called input perturbation [46, 41],
whereas perturbing the outputs of a query or analysis using noise addition or rule hiding is called out-
put perturbation. Unidimensional perturbation and multidimensional perturbation [46, 47, 48, 49] are
the two main types of input perturbation classes. Examples for unidimensional perturbation include
but are not limited to additive perturbation [16], randomized response [50], and swapping [51]. Con-
densation [52], random rotation [9], geometric perturbation [10], random projection [48], and hybrid
perturbation are types of multidimensional perturbation [41]. Microaggregation[53] can be consid-
ered as a hybrid perturbation mechanism that possesses both unidimensional and multidimensional
perturbation capabilities.
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As privacy models evolved, the limits of privacy imposed by particular mechanisms were eval-
uated [18], and new models were defined to overcome the issues of their predecessors. For ex-
ample, l − diversity [21] was defined to overcome the shortcomings of k − anonymity [19], then
(α, k)− anonymity [54], t− closeness [55] were proposed as further improvements. However, all these
models eventually exhibited vulnerabilities to different attacks such as minimality [22], composition [23]
and foreground knowledge [24] attacks. Moreover, these models were not scalable enough to address
the curse of dimensionality presented by big data and data streams [31, 56], hence resulted in higher
privacy leak [31]. In recent years differential privacy (DP) has drawn much attention as a power-
ful privacy model due to its inherent strong privacy guarantee. Differential privacy that is achieved
via output perturbation is known as global differential privacy (GDP), whereas differential privacy
achieved using input perturbation is known as local differential privacy (LDP). Laplacian mechanism
and randomized response are two of the most frequently employed data perturbation methods used
to achieve GDP and LDP [57, 17]. LDP permits full or partial data release allowing the analysis of
the perturbed data [58, 59], while GDP requires a trusted curator who enforces differential privacy by
applying noise or randomization on results generated by running queries or by analysis of the orig-
inal data [58]. Nevertheless, LDP algorithms are still at a rudimentary stage when it comes to full
or partial data release of real-valued numerical data, and the complexity of selecting the domain of
randomization with respect to a single data instance is still a challenge [60, 61, 29]. Consequently,
existing DP mechanisms are not suitable for differentially private data release.
Two important characteristics that determine the robustness of a particular perturbation mech-
anism are the ability to (1) protect against data reconstruction attacks and (2) perform well when
high dimensional datasets and data streams are introduced. A data reconstruction attack tries to
re-identify the individual owners of the data by reconstructing the original dataset from the perturbed
dataset. Data reconstruction attacks are normally custom built for different perturbation methods
using the properties of the perturbation mechanisms to restore the original data systematically. Dif-
ferent perturbation scenarios are vulnerable to different data reconstruction attacks. Principal com-
ponent analysis [62], maximum likelihood estimation [63], known I/O attack [64], ICA attack [65] and
known sample attack [64] are some examples of common data reconstruction attacks. For example,
additive perturbation is vulnerable to principal component analysis [66] and maximum likelihood esti-
mation [66], whereas multiplicative data perturbation methods are vulnerable to known input/output
(I/O) attacks, known sample attacks and ICA attacks. These reconstruction attacks exploit the high
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information leak due to the dimensionality curse associated with high-dimensional data. In addition
to providing extra information to the attacker, high-dimensional data also exponentially increases the
amount of necessary computations [31, 21, 9, 10].
The literature shows methods that try to provide privacy-preserving solutions for data streams and
big data by addressing the dimensionality curse in data streams. Recent attempts include a method
proposing steered microaggregation to anonymize a data stream to achieve k − anonymity [67], but
the problem of information leak inherent in k − anonymity in case of high dimensional data can be a
shortcoming of the method. Xuyun Zhang et al. [68] introduced a scalable data anonymization with
MapReduce for big data privacy preservation. The proposed method first splits an original data set
into partitions that contain similar data records in terms of quasi-identifiers and then locally recodes
the data partitions by the proximity-aware agglomerative clustering algorithm in parallel which limits
producing sufficient utility for data streams such as produced by SCPS. Further, the requirement
of advanced processing capabilities precludes its application to resource-constrained devices. Data
condensation is another contender for data stream privacy preservation [69]. The problem, in this case,
is that when the method parameters are set to achieve high accuracy (using small spatial locality),
the privacy of the data often suffers. P 2RoCAl is a privacy preservation algorithm that provides
high scalability for data streams and big data composed of millions of data records. P 2RoCAl is
based on data condensation and random geometric transformations. Although P 2RoCAl provides
linear complexity for the number of tuples, the computational complexity increases exponentially for
the number of attributes [70]. PABIDOT is a scalable privacy preservation algorithm for big data
[71]. PABIDOT comes with a new privacy model named Φ − separation, which facilitates full data
release with optimum privacy protection. PABIDOT can process millions of records efficiently as it
has linear time complexity for the number of instances. However, PABIDOT also shows exponential
time complexity for the number of attributes of a dataset [71]. Other examples include the use of a
Naive Bayesian Classifier for private data streams [72], and the method to efficiently and effectively
track the correlation and autocorrelation structure of multivariate streams and leverage it to add noise
to preserve privacy [73]. The latter methods are also vulnerable to data reconstruction attacks such
as principal component analysis-based attacks.
The complex dynamics exhibited by SCPS require efficient privacy preservation methods scalable
enough to handle exponentially growing databases and data streams such as IoT stream data. Existing
privacy-preserving mechanisms have difficulties in maintaining the balance between privacy and utility
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while providing sufficient efficiency and scalability. This paper tries to fill the gap, and proposes a
privacy-preserving algorithm for SCPS which solves the existing issues.
3. Fundamentals
In this section, we provide some background and discuss the fundamentals used in the proposed
method (SEAL). Our approach is generating a privacy-preserved version of the dataset in question, and
allowing only the generated dataset to be used in any application. We use Chebyshev interpolation
based on least square fitting to model a particular input data series, and the model formation is
subjected to noise addition using the Laplacian mechanism used in differential privacy. The noise
integrated model is then used to synthesize a perturbed data series which approximate the properties
of the original input data series.
3.1. Chebyshev Polynomials of the First Kind
For the interpolation of the input dataset, we use Chebyshev Polynomials of the First Kind. These
polynomials are a set of orthogonal polynomials as given by Definition 3 (available in Appendix A)
[74]. Chebyshev polynomials are a sequence of orthonormal polynomials that can be defined recursively.
Polynomial approximation and numerical integration are two of the areas where Chebyshev polynomials
are heavily used [74]. More details on Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind can be found in Appendix
A.
3.2. Least Squares Fitting
Least squares fitting (LSF) is a mathematical procedure which minimizes the sum of squares of the
offsets of the points from the curve to find the best-fitting curve to a given set of points. We can use
vertical least squares fitting which proceeds by finding the sum of squares of the vertical derivations R2
(refer Equation B.1 in Appendix B) of a set of n data points [75]. To generate a linear fit considering
f(x) = mx+ b, we can minimize the expression of squared error between the estimated values and the
original values (refer Equation B.5), which proceeds to obtaining the linear system shown in Equation
1 (using Equations B.8 and B.9). We can solve Equation 1 to find values of a and b to obtain the
corresponding linear fit of f(x) = mx+ b for a given data series.
 b
m
 =
 n (∑ni=1 xi)(∑n
i=1 xi
) (∑n
i=1 x
2
i
)

−1  ∑ni=1 yi∑n
i=1 xiyi
 (1)
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3.3. Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy (DP) is a privacy model that defines the bounds to how much information can
be revealed to a third party or adversary about someone’s data being present or absent in a particular
database. Conventionally,  (epsilon) and δ (delta) are used to denote the level of privacy rendered by
a randomized privacy preserving algorithm (M) over a particular database (D). Let us take two x and
y adjacent datasets of D, where y differs from x only by one person. Then M satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy if Equation (2) holds.
Privacy Budget and Privacy Loss ():  is called the privacy budget that provides an insight
into the privacy loss of a DP algorithm. When the corresponding  value of a particular differentially
private algorithm A is increased, the amount of noise or randomization applied by A on the input data
is decreased. The higher the value of , the higher the privacy loss.
Probability to Fail a.k.a. Probability of Error (δ): δ is the parameter that accounts for ”bad events”
that might result in high privacy loss; δ is the probability of the output revealing the identity of a
particular individual, which can happen n × δ times where n is the number of records. To minimize
the risk of privacy loss, n × δ has to be maintained at a low value. For example, the probability of a
bad event is 1% when δ = 1100×n .
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M with domain N |X| and range R is (, δ)-differentially private
for δ ≥ 0, if for every adjacent x, y ∈ N |X| and for any subset S ⊆ R
Pr[(M(x) ∈ S)] ≤ exp()Pr[(M(y) ∈ S)] + δ (2)
3.4. Global vs. Local Differential Privacy
Global differential privacy (GDP) and local differential privacy (LDP) are the two main approaches
to differential privacy. In the GDP setting, there is a trusted curator who applies carefully calibrated
random noise to the real values returned for a particular query. The GDP setting is also called
the trusted curator model [76]. Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism [57] are two of the
most frequently used noise generation methods in GDP [57]. A randomized algorithm, M provides
-global differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets x, y and S ⊆ R, Pr[(M(x) ∈ S)] ≤
exp()Pr[(M(y) ∈ S)] + δ (i.e. Equation (2) holds). On the other hand, LDP eliminates the need of a
trusted curator by randomizing the data before the curator can access them. Hence, LDP is also called
the untrusted curator model [59]. LDP can also be used by a trusted party to randomize all records in
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a database at once. LDP algorithms may often produce too noisy data, as noise is applied commonly
to achieve individual record privacy. LDP is considered to be a strong and rigorous notion of privacy
that provides plausible deniability. Due to the above properties, LDP is deemed to be a state-of-the-art
approach for privacy-preserving data collection and distribution. A randomized algorithm A provides
-local differential privacy if Equation (3) holds [60].
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A satisfies -local differential privacy, if for all pairs of inputs
v1 and v2, for all Q ⊆ Range(A) and for ( ≥ 0) Equation (3) holds. Range(A) is the set of all
possible outputs of the randomized algorithm A.
Pr[A(v1) ∈ Q] ≤ exp()Pr[A(v2) ∈ Q] (3)
3.5. Sensitivity
Sensitivity is defined as the maximum influence that a single individual data item can have on the
result of a numeric query. Consider a function f , the sensitivity (∆f) of f can be given as in Equation
(4) where x and y are two neighboring databases (or in LDP, adjacent records) and ‖.‖1 represents the
L1 norm of a vector [77].
∆f = max{‖f(x)− f(y)‖1} (4)
3.6. Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism is considered to be one of the most generic mechanisms to achieve differ-
ential privacy [57]. Laplace noise can be added to a function output (F (D)) as given in Equation (6)
to produce a differentially private output. ∆f denotes the sensitivity of the function f . In the local
differentially private setting, the scale of the Laplacian noise is equal to ∆f/, and the position is the
current input value (F (D)).
PF (D) = F (D) + Lap(
∆f

) (5)
PF (D) =

2∆f
e−
|x−F (D)|
∆F (6)
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4. Our Approach
The proposed method, SEAL, is designed to preserve the privacy of big data and data streams
generated by systems such as smart cyber-physical systems. One of our aims was balancing privacy and
utility, as they may adversely affect each other. For example, the spatial arrangement of a dataset can
potentially contribute to its utility in data mining, as the results generated by the analysis mechanisms
such as data classification and clustering are often influenced by the spatial arrangement of the input
data. However, the spatial arrangement can be affected when privacy mechanisms apply methods like
randomization. In other words, while data perturbation mechanisms improve privacy, at the same time
they may reduce utility. Conversely, an increasing utility can detrimentally affect privacy. To address
these difficulties, SEAL processes the data in three steps: (1) determine the sensitivity of the dataset
to calibrate how much random noise is necessary to provide sufficient privacy, (2) conduct polynomial
interpolation with calibrated noise to approximate a noisy function over the original data, and (3)
use the approximated function to generate perturbed data. These steps guarantee that SEAL applies
enough randomization to preserve privacy while preserving the spatial arrangement of the original data.
SEAL uses polynomial interpolation accompanied by noise addition, which is calibrated according to
the instructions of differential privacy. We use the first four orders of the Chebyshev polynomial of
the first kind in the polynomial interpolation process. Then we calibrate random Laplacian noise to
apply a stochastic error to the interpolation process, in order to generate the perturbed data. Figure
1 shows the integration of SEAL in the general purpose data flow of SCPS. As shown in the figure, the
data perturbed by the SEAL layer comes directly from the SCPS. That means that the data in the
storage module has already gone through SEAL’s privacy preservation process and does not contain
any original data.
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Figure 1: Arrangement of SEAL in a smart system environment. In this setting, we assume that the original data are
perturbed before reaching the storage devices. Any public or private services will have access only to the perturbed data.
Figure 2 shows the flow of SEAL where the proposed noisy Chebyshev model (represented by a
green note) is used to approximate each of the individual attributes of a particular input dataset or
data stream. The approximated noisy function is used to synthesize perturbed data, which is then
subjected to random tuple shuffling to reduce the vulnerability to data linkage attacks.
4.1. Privacy-Preserving Polynomial Interpolation for Noisy Chebyshev Model Generation
We approximate an input data series (experimental data) by a functional expression with added
randomization in order to inherit the properties of differential privacy. For approximation, our method
uses the first four orders of Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind. We systematically add calibrated
random Laplacian noise in the interpolation process, i.e. apply randomization to the approximation.
Then we use the approximated function to re-generate the dataset in a privacy-preserving manner. We
can denote an approximated function fˆ of degree (m−1) using Equation 7, where the degree of (ϕk) is
k−1. For the approximation, we consider the root mean square error (RMSE) E between the estimated
values and the original values (refer to Equation C.14). We use the first four Chebyshev polynomials
of the first kind for the approximation, which limits the number of coefficients to four (we name the
coefficients as a1, a2, a3, and a4). Now we can minimize E (the RMSE) to obtain an estimated function
fˆ∗(x), thus seeking to minimize the squared error M(a1, a2, a3, a4). For more details refer to Equation
C.15, where a1, a2, . . . , am are coefficients and ϕ1(x), ϕ2(x), . . . , ϕm(x) are Chebyshev polynomials of
first kind.
fˆ(x) = a1ϕ1(x) + a2ϕ2(x) + · · ·+ amϕm(x) (7)
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4.1.1. Introducing privacy to the approximation process utilizing differential privacy (the determination
of the sensitivity and the position of Laplacian noise)
We apply the notion of differential privacy to the private data generation process by introducing
randomized Laplacian noise to the root mean square error (RMSE) minimization process. Random
Laplacian noise introduces a calibrated randomized error in deriving the values for a1, a2, a3, and a4
with an error (refer to Equations C.22, C.25, C.28 and C.31). We add Laplacian noise with a sensitivity
of 1, as the input dataset is normalized within the bounds of 0 and 1, which restricts the minimum
output to 0 and maximum output to 1 (refer to Equation (C.20)). We select the position of Laplacian
noise to be 0, as the goal is to keep the local minima of RMSE around 0. We can factorize the noise
introduced squared error minimization equations to form a linear system which can be denoted by
Equation 8. C is the coefficient matrix obtained from the factorized expressions, A is the coefficient
vector obtained from M , and B is the constant vector obtained from the factorized expressions (refer
Equations C.24, C.27, C.30, and C.33 where mij denote the coefficients and bi denote the constants).
CA = B (8)
Where,
C =

m11 m12 m13 m14
m21 m22 m23 m24
m31 m32 m33 m34
m41 m42 m43 m44

(9)
A = [a1, a2, a3, a4]
T
(10)
B = [b1, b2, b3, b4]
T
(11)
Now we solve the corresponding linear system (formed using Equations C.35-C.37), to obtain noisy
values for a1, a2, a3, and a4 in order to approximate the input data series with a noisy function. The
results will differ each time we calculate the values for a1, a2, a3, and a4 as we have randomized the
process of interpolation by adding randomized Laplacian noise calibrated using a user-defined  value.
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Figure 2: The basic flow of SEAL. The users can calibrate the level of privacy using the privacy budget parameter ().
The smaller the , the higher the privacy. It is recommended to use an  in the interval (0, 10), which is considered to
be the default range to provide a sufficient level of privacy.
4.2. Algorithmic Steps of SEAL for Static Data and Data Streams
Algorithm 1 presents the systematic flow of steps in randomizing the data to produce a privacy-
preserving output. The algorithm accepts input dataset (D), privacy budget  (defined in Equation
C.21), window size (ws) and threshold (t) as the input parameters. The window size defines the number
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of data instances to be perturbed in one cycle of randomization. The window size of a data stream is
essential to maintain the speed of the post-processing analysis/modification (e.g. data perturbation,
classification, and clustering) done to the data stream [78]. For static data sets, the threshold is
maintained with a default value of −1. For a static dataset, t = −1 ignores that a specific number
of perturbed windows need to be released before the whole dataset is completed. In the case of data
streams, the window size (ws) and the threshold t are useful as ws can be maintained as a data buffer
and t can be specified with a certain number to let the algorithm know that it has to release every t
number of processed windows. Maintaining t is important for data streams because data streams are
growing infinitely in most cases, and the algorithm makes sure that the data is released in predefined
intervals.
According to conventional differential privacy, the acceptable values of  should be within a small
range, ideally in the interval of (0, 9] [79]. Due to the lower sensitivity of the interpolation process,
increasing  greater than 2 may lower privacy. It is the users’ responsibility to decrease or increase 
depending on the requirements. We suggest an  of 1 to have a balance between privacy and utility.
If the user chooses an  value less than 1, the algorithm will provide higher randomization, hence
providing higher privacy and lower utility, whereas lower privacy and a higher utility will be provided
in case of an  value higher than 1. The selection of ws depends specifically on the size of the particular
dataset. A comparably larger ws can be chosen for a large dataset, while ws can be smaller for a small
dataset. For a static dataset, ws can range from a smaller value such as one-tenth the size of the
dataset to the full size of the dataset. The minimum value of ws should not go down to a small value
(e.g. < 100) because it increases the number of perturbation cycles and introduces an extreme level
of randomization to the input dataset, resulting in poor utility. For a data stream, ws is considered
as the buffer size and can range from a smaller value to any number of tuples that fit in the memory
of the computer. Further discussions on selecting suitable values for  and ws is provided in Section
5.2.1.
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Algorithm 1 Steps of the perturbation algorithm: SEAL
Inputs :
D ← input dataset (numeric)
 ← scale of Laplacian noise
ws ← data buffer/window size
t ← threshold for the maximum number of windows processed
before a data release (default value of t = −1)
Outputs : Dp ← perturbed dataset
1: divide D in to data partitions (wi) of size ws
2: x = [1, . . . , ws]
3: normalize x within the bounds of [0, 1]
4: for each wi do
5: rep=rep+1
6: Dp = [] . empty matrix
7: normalize data of wi within the bounds of [0, 1]
8: for each attribute ai in wi do
9: sai = sort(ai) . sorted in ascending order
10: generate M . according to Equation C.35
11: generate B . according to Equation C.37
12: A = B ∗M−1
13: use A = [a1, a2, a3, a4] to generate perturbed data (a
p
i ) using
ˆf(x) . refer Equation C.12
14: normalize api within the bounds of [0, 1] to generate a
N
i
15: normalize aNi within the bounds of [min(ai),max(ai)]
16: resort aNi to the original order of ai to generate a
o
i
17: end for
18: merge all aoi to generate w
p
i
19: Dp = merge(Dp, wpi )
20: if rep==t then
21: randomly swap the tuple of Dp
22: release Dp
23: rep=0
24: end if
25: end for
26: if t==-1 then
27: randomly swap the tuple of Dp
28: return Dp
29: end if
End Algorithm
4.3. A use case: SEAL integration in a healthcare smart cyber-physical system
Biomedical and healthcare systems provide numerous opportunities and challenges for SCPS. Intel-
ligent operating rooms and hospitals, image-guided surgery and therapy, fluid flow control for medicine
and biological assays and the development of physical and neural prostheses are some of the exam-
ples for biomedical and healthcare systems which can be effectively facilitated and improved using
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SCPS [80]. However, biomedicine and healthcare data can contain a large amount of sensitive, per-
sonal information. SEAL provides a practical solution and can impose privacy in such scenarios to
limit potential privacy leak from such systems [80].
Figure 3 shows a use case for SEAL integration in a healthcare smart cyber-physical system.
Patients can have several sensors attached to them for recording different physical parameters. The
recorded data are then transmitted to a central unit which can be any readily available digital device
such as a smartphone, a personal computer, or an embedded computer. A large variety of sensors
are available today, e.g. glucose monitors, blood pressure monitors [81]. In the proposed setting, we
assume that the processing unit that runs SEAL, perturbs all sensitive inputs forwarded to the central
unit. As shown in the figure, we assume that the central units do not receive any unperturbed sensitive
information, and the data repositories will store only perturbed data, locally or in a remote data center.
Data analysts can access and use only the perturbed data to conduct their analyses. Since the data is
perturbed, adversarial attacks on privacy will not be successful.
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Figure 3: A use case: The integration of SEAL in a healthcare smart cyber-physical system. As shown in the figure,
SEAL perturbs data as soon as they leave the source (medical sensors, medical devices, etc.). In the proposed setting,
SEAL assumes that there is no trusted party.
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5. Experimental Results
In this section, we discuss the experimental setup, resources used, experiments, and their results.
The experiments were conducted using seven datasets retrieved from the UCI data repository2. We
compare the results of SEAL against the results of rotation perturbation (RP), geometric perturbation
(GP) and data condensation (DC). For performance comparison with SEAL, we selected GP and RP
when using static datasets, while DC was used with data streams. The main reason for selecting
GP, RP, and DC is that they are multidimensional perturbation mechanisms that correlate with the
technique used in the linear system of SEAL as given in Equation C.34. Figure 4 shows the analytical
setup which was used to test the performance of SEAL. We perturbed the input data using SEAL, RP,
GP, and DC and conducted data classification experiments on the perturbed data using five different
classification algorithms to test and compare utility. We used the default settings of 10 iterations with
a noise factor (sigma) of 0.3 to perturb the data using RP and GP. Next, SEAL was tested for its
attack resistance against naive inference, known I/O attacks, and ICA-based attacks that are based on
data reconstruction. These attacks are more successful against perturbation methods that use matrix
multiplications. The attack resistance results of SEAL were then compared with the attack resistance
results of RP, GP, and DC. Subsequently, we tested and compared SEAL’s computational complexity
and scalability by using two large datasets. Finally, we tested the performance of SEAL on data
streams and compared the results with the results of DC.
Original Data
Perturb data 
using SEAL
Conduct Analysis AttackResilience 
Classification 
Accuracy 
Efficiency 
Analysis 
Perturbed Data
Figure 4: The analytical setup used for SEAL. The figure shows the different levels of performance analysis of SEAL.
First, the time consumption of perturbation was recorded under the efficiency analysis. Next, the attack resistance and
classification accuracy were analyzed upon the perturbed data.
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/index.php
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5.1. Experimental Setup
For the experiments we used a Windows 10 (Home 64-bit, Build 17134) computer with Intel (R)
i5-6200U (6th generation) CPU (2 cores with 4 logical threads, 2.3 GHz with turbo up to 2.8 GHz) and
8192 MB RAM. The scalability of the proposed algorithm was tested using a Linux (SUSE Enterprise
Server 11 SP4) SGI UV3000 supercomputer, with 64 Intel Haswell 10-core processors, 25MB cache and
8TB of global shared memory connected by SGI’s NUMAlink interconnect. We implemented SEAL in
MATLAB R2016b. The experiments on data classification were carried out on Weka 3.6 [82], which is
a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks.
5.1.1. Datasets used in the experiments
A brief description of the datasets is given in Table 1. The dimensions of the datasets used for the
performance testing vary from small to extremely large, to check the performance of SEAL in different
circumstances. Since the current version of SEAL conducts perturbation only on numerical data; we
selected only numerical datasets in which the only attribute containing non-numerical data is the class
attribute.
Table 1: Short descriptions of the datasets selected for testing.
Dataset Abbreviation Number of Records Number of Attributes Number of Classes
Wholesale customers3 WCDS 440 8 2
Wine Quality4 WQDS 4898 12 7
Page Blocks Classification 5 PBDS 5473 11 5
Letter Recognition6 LRDS 20000 17 26
Statlog (Shuttle)7 SSDS 58000 9 7
HEPMASS8 HPDS 3310816 28 2
HIGGS9 HIDS 11000000 28 2
5.1.2. Perturbation methods used for comparison
Random rotation perturbation (RP), geometric data perturbation (GP), and data condensation
(DC) are three types of matrix multiplicative perturbation approaches which are considered to provide
high utility in classification and clustering [83]. In RP, the original data matrix is multiplied using
a random rotation matrix which has the properties of an orthogonal matrix. A rotational matrix
R follows the property of R × RT = RT × R = I, where I is the identity matrix. The application
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wholesale+customers
4https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Wine+Quality
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Page+Blocks+Classification
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Letter+Recognition
7https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+%28Shuttle%29
8https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HEPMASS#
9https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/HIGGS#
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of rotation is repeated until the algorithm converges at the desired level of privacy [9]. In GP, a
random translation matrix is added to the process of perturbation in order to enhance privacy. The
method accompanies three components: rotation perturbation, translation perturbation, and distance
perturbation [10]. Due to the isometric nature of transformations, the perturbation process preserves
the distance between the tuples, resulting in high utility for classification and clustering. RP and
GP can only be used for static datasets in their current setting, due to their recursive approach to
deriving the optimal perturbation. DC is specifically introduced for data streams. In DC, data are
divided into multiple homogeneous groups of predefined size (accepted as user input) in such a way that
the difference between the records in a particular group is minimal, and a certain level of statistical
information about different records is maintained. The sanitized data is generated using a uniform
random distribution based on the eigenvectors which are generated using the eigendecomposition of
the characteristic covariance matrices of each homogeneous group [52].
5.1.3. Classification algorithms used in the experiments
Different classes of classification algorithms employ different classification strategies [84]. To inves-
tigate the performance of SEAL with diverse classification methods, we chose five different algorithms
as the representative of different classes, namely: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [82], k-Nearest Neigh-
bor (kNN) [82], Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) [85], Naive Bayes [82], and J48 [86], and
tested SEAL for its utility in terms of classification accuracy. MLP uses back-propagation to classify
instances [82]. kNN is a non-parametric method used for classification [82]. SMO is an implementa-
tion of John Platt’s sequential minimal optimization algorithm for training a support vector classifier
[85]. Naive Bayes is a fast classification algorithm based on probabilistic classifiers [82]. J48 is an
implementation of the decision tree based classification algorithm [82].
5.2. Performance Evaluation of SEAL
We evaluated the performance of SEAL with regard to classification accuracy, attack resistance,
time complexity, scalability, and also looked at data streams. First, we generated perturbed data using
SEAL, RP, GP, and DC for the datasets: WCDS, WQDS, PBDS, LRDS, and SSDS (refer to Table 1)
under the corresponding settings. The perturbed data were then used to determine classification accu-
racy and attack resistance for each perturbed dataset. During the classification accuracy experiments,
k of k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classification algorithm was kept at 1. The aggregated results were
rated using the nonparametric statistical comparison test, Friedman’s rank test, which is analogous
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to a standard one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance [87]. We recorded the statistical signifi-
cance values, and the Friedman’s mean ranks (FMR) returned by the rank test. The time consumption
of SEAL was evaluated using runtime complexity analysis. We ran SEAL on two large-scale datasets,
HPDS and HIDS, to test its scalability. Finally, the performance of SEAL was tested on data streams
by running it on the LRDS dataset, and the results were compared with those produced by DC.
5.2.1. Effect of randomization on the degree of privacy
One of the main features of SEAL is its ability to perturb a dataset while preserving the original
shape of data distribution. We ran SEAL on the same data series to detect the effect of randomization
in two different instances of perturbation. This experiment is to check and guarantee that SEAL does
not publish similar perturbed data when it is applied with the same  value to the same data on
different occasions. This feature enables SEAL to prevent privacy leak via data linkage attacks that
are exploiting multiple data releases. As depicted in Figure 5, in two separate applications, SEAL
generates two distinct randomized data series, while preserving the shape of the original data series.
The left-hand plot of Figure 5 shows the data generated under an  of 1, whereas the right-hand
plot shows the data generated under an  of 0.1. The right plot clearly shows the effect of high
randomization under the extreme level of privacy generated by a strict privacy budget () of 0.1.
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(a) Effect of perturbations by SEAL with  = 1 on the
same data series in two different instances.
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(b) Effect of perturbations by SEAL with  = 0.1 on the
same data series in two different instances.
Figure 5: Effect of perturbation by SEAL. The plot with the staircase pattern represents the original data series (first
attribute of the LRDS dataset). The two plots that were plotted above the original data series represent two instances
of perturbation conducted by SEAL on the original data series.
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5.2.2. Dynamics of privacy budget () and window size (ws)
As explained in Section 5.2.1, smaller  means higher randomization, which results in decreased
utility. Figure 6a shows the change of classification accuracy against an increasing . As shown in the
figure, classification accuracy increases with an increasing privacy budget (). Figure 6a shows a more
predictable pattern of increasing utility (classification accuracy) against increasing . The choice of
a proper  depends on the application requirements: a case that needs higher privacy should have a
smaller , while a larger  will provide better utility. As it turns out, two-digit  values provide no useful
privacy. Given that SEAL tries to preserve the shape of the original data distribution, we recommend
a range of 0.4 to 3 for  to limit unanticipated privacy leaks. We showed that SEAL provides better
privacy and utility than comparable methods under a privacy budget of 1.
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Figure 6: Classification accuracy of SEAL. The classification accuracy was obtained by classifying the corresponding
datasets using the J48 classification algorithm. The orange dotted horizontal lines on the two plots represent the
classification accuracy of the original dataset. The window size (ws) is measured in number of tuples.
Next, we tested the effect of window size (ws) on classification accuracy and the magnitude of
randomization performed by SEAL. As shown on Figure 6b, classification accuracy increases when
ws increases. When ws is small, the dataset is divided into more groups than when ws is large.
When there is more than one group to be perturbed, SEAL applies randomization on each group
distinctly. Since each of the groups is subjected to distinct randomization, the higher the number of
groups, the larger the perturbation of the dataset. For smaller sizes of ws, SEAL will produce higher
perturbation, resulting in more noise, reduced accuracy, improved privacy, and better resistance to
data reconstruction attacks.
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5.2.3. Classification accuracy
Table 2: Classification accuracies obtained when using the original dataset and the datasets perturned by three methods.
During the experiments conducted using SEAL, the privacy budget  was maintained at 1. The window size ws was
maintained at full length of the corresponding dataset. For example, ws of SEAL for the LRDS dataset was maintained at
20,000 during the experiments presented in this table. The last row shows the mean ranks returned by the nonparametric
statistical comparison test (Friedman’s rank test on the classification accuracies) of the three methods. A larger FMR
value represents better classification accuracy.
Dataset Algorithm MLP IBK SVM Naive Bayes J48
LRDS Original 82.20% 95.96% 82.44% 64.01% 87.92%
RP 74.04% 87.19% 71.07% 48.41% 64.89%
GP 79.12% 93.05% 77.92% 59.89% 70.54%
SEAL 80.59% 93.67% 81.71% 63.10% 85.28%
PBDS Original 96.25% 96.02% 92.93% 90.85% 96.88%
RP 92.00% 95.52% 89.99% 35.76% 95.61%
GP 90.24% 95.67% 89.93% 43.10% 95.49%
SEAL 96.34% 96.73% 95.59% 86.97% 96.34%
SSDS Original 99.72% 99.94% 96.83% 91.84% 99.96%
RP 96.26% 99.80% 88.21% 69.04% 99.51%
GP 98.73% 99.81% 78.41% 79.18% 99.59%
SEAL 99.70% 99.21% 98.51% 89.94% 99.87%
WCDS Original 90.91% 87.95% 87.73% 89.09% 90.23%
RP 89.09% 85.00% 82.27% 84.55% 86.82%
GP 91.82% 86.59% 85.00% 84.32% 88.86%
SEAL 89.32% 86.82% 89.09% 88.41% 86.59%
WQDS Original 54.94% 64.54% 52.14% 44.67% 59.82%
RP 47.65% 53.29% 44.88% 32.32% 45.53%
GP 48.86% 56.88% 44.88% 32.16% 46.43%
SEAL 53.92% 64.02% 52.02% 47.83% 84.15%
FMR Values RP: 1.34 GP: 1.86 SEAL: 2.80
Table 2 provides the classification accuracies when using the original dataset and the datasets
perturbed by the three methods. During the experiments for classification accuracy, we maintained
 at 1 and ws at the total length of the dataset. For example, if the dataset contained n number
of tuples, ws was maintained at n. After producing the classification accuracies, Friedman’s rank
test was conducted on the data available in Table 2 to rank the three methods: GP, RP, and SEAL.
The mean ranks produced by Friedman’s rank (FR) test are presented in the last row of Table 210.
The p-value suggests that the difference between the classification accuracies of RP, GP, and SEAL
are significantly different. When evaluating FMR values on classification accuracies, a higher rank
means that the corresponding method tends to produce better classification results. The mean ranks
indicate that SEAL provides comparatively higher classification accuracy. SEAL is capable of providing
higher utility in terms of classification accuracy due to its ability to maintain the shape of the original
10The FR test returned a χ2 value of 27.6566, a degree of freedom of 2 and a p-value of 9.8731e-07.
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data distribution despite the introduced randomization. Although SEAL provides better performance
overall than the other two methods, we can notice that in a few cases (as shown in Table 2) SEAL
has produced slightly lower classification accuracies. We assume that this is due to the effect of
variable random noise applied by SEAL. However, these lower accuracies are still on par with accuracies
produced by the other two methods.
5.2.4. Attack resistance
Table 3 shows the three methods’ (RP, GP, and SEAL) resistance to three attack methods: naive
snooping (NI), independent component analysis (ICA) and known I/O attack (IO) [9, 83]. We used the
same parameter settings of SEAL ( = 1 and ws=number of tuples) which were used in classification
accuracy experiments for attack resistance analysis as well. IO and ICA data reconstruction attacks
try to restore the original data from the perturbed data and are more successful in attacking matrix
multiplicative data perturbation. FastICA package [88] was used to evaluate the effectiveness of ICA-
based reconstruction of the perturbed data. We obtained the attack resistance values as standard
deviation values of (i) the difference between the normalized original data and the perturbed data
for NI, and (ii) the difference between the normalized original data and reconstructed data for ICA
and IO. During the IO attack analysis, we assume that around 10% of the original data is known to
the adversary. The “min” values under each test indicate the minimum guarantee of resistance while
“avg” values give an impression of the overall resistance.
We evaluated the data available in Table 3 using Friedman’s rank test to generate the mean ranks
for GP, RP, and SEAL. The mean ranks produced by Friedman’s rank test are given in the last row of
Table 311. The p-value implies that the difference between the attack resistance values is significantly
different. As for the FMR values on attack resistance, a higher rank means that the corresponding
method tends to be more attack-resistant. The mean ranks suggest that SEAL provides comparatively
higher security than the comparable methods against the privacy attacks.
11The test statistics: χ2 value of 14.6387, a degree of freedom of 2 and a p-value of 6.6261e-04.
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Table 3: Attack resistance of the algorithms. During the experiments conducted using SEAL, the privacy budget  was
maintained at 1. The window size ws was maintained at full length of the corresponding dataset. For example, ws of
SEAL for the LRDS dataset was maintained at 20,000 during the experiments presented in this table. The last row
provides Friedman’s mean ranks returned by the nonparametric statistical comparison test on the three methods.
Dataset Algorithm NImin NIavg ICAmin ICAavg IOmin IOavg
LRDS RP 0.8750 1.4490 0.4057 0.6942 0.0945 0.2932
GP 1.3248 1.6175 0.6402 0.7122 0.0584 0.4314
SEAL 1.4061 1.4148 0.7024 0.7062 0.6986 0.7056
PBDS RP 0.7261 1.3368 0.5560 0.6769 0.0001 0.1242
GP 0.2845 1.4885 0.1525 0.6834 0.0000 0.1048
SEAL 1.3900 1.4084 0.7008 0.7056 0.6932 0.7031
SSDS RP 1.2820 1.5015 0.1751 0.5909 0.0021 0.0242
GP 1.4490 1.6285 0.0062 0.3240 0.0011 0.0111
SEAL 1.4065 1.4119 0.7038 0.7068 0.7027 0.7068
WCDS RP 1.0105 1.3098 0.6315 0.7362 0.0000 0.0895
GP 1.4620 1.7489 0.1069 0.6052 0.0000 0.1003
SEAL 1.3130 1.3733 0.6775 0.7053 0.6557 0.6930
WQDS RP 1.2014 1.4957 0.4880 0.7062 0.0057 0.4809
GP 1.3463 1.6097 0.3630 0.6536 0.0039 0.4025
SEAL 1.3834 1.4138 0.7018 0.7053 0.6859 0.7026
FMR Values RP: 1.68 GP: 1.75 SEAL: 2.57
5.2.5. Time complexity
Algorithm 1 (SEAL) has two loops. One loop is controlled by the number of data partitions
resulting from the window size (ws), and the number of attributes controls the other loop. In a
particular instance of perturbation, these two parameters (ws and the number of attributes) remain
constants. Let us take the contribution of both loops to the computational complexity as a constant
(k). If we evaluate the steps of SEAL from step 9 to step 23, we can see that the highest computational
complexity in these steps is O(n), where n is the number of tuples. From this, we can estimate the
time complexity of Algorithm 1 to be O(kn) = O(n). We investigated the time consumption against
the number of instances and the number of attributes to determine the computational complexity
empirically. Figure 7 confirms that the time complexity of SEAL is in fact O(n).
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Figure 7: Time consumption of SEAL. During the runtime analysis, the window size (ws) was maintained at a full length
of the corresponding instance of LRDS. The privacy budget () was maintained at 1.
5.2.6. Time complexity comparison
Both RP and GP show O(n2) time complexity to perturb one record with n attributes. The total
complexity to perturb a dataset of m records is O(m × n2). However, both RP and GP run for r
number of iterations (which is taken as a user input) to find the optimal perturbation instance of
the dataset within the r iterations. Therefore, the overall complexity is O(m × r × n2). Under each
iteration of r, the algorithms run data reconstruction using ICA and known IO attacks to find the
vulnerability level of the perturbed dataset. Each attack runs another k number of iterations (which
is another user input) to reconstruct k number of instances. Usually, k is much larger than r. For one
iteration of k, IO and ICA contribute a complexity of O(n×m) [89]. Hence, the overall complexity of
RP or GP in producing an optimal perturbed dataset is equal to O(m2 × r× k× n3) which is a much
larger computational complexity compared to the linear computational complexity of SEAL. Figure 8
shows the time consumption plots of the three methods plotted together on the same figure. As shown
on the figures, the curves of SEAL lie almost on the x-axis due to its extremely low time consumption
compared to the other two methods.
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Figure 8: Time consumption comparison of SEAL, RP, and GP. The time consumption plots available in Figure 7 are
plotted in comparison with the time consumption plots of RP and GP. Due to the extremely low time consumption of
SEAL, its curves lie almost on the x-axis when drawn in a plot together with the others.
5.2.7. Scalability
We conducted the scalability analysis of SEAL on an SGI UV3000 supercomputer (a detailed
specification of the supercomputer is given in Section 5.1). SEAL was tested for its scalability on two
large datasets: HPDS and HIDS. The results are given in Table 4. It is apparent that SEAL is more
efficient than RP, GP, and DC; in fact, RP and GP did not even converge after 100 hours (the time
limit of the batch scripts were set to 100 h). Both RP and GP use recursive loops to achieve optimal
perturbation, which slows down the perturbation process. Therefore, RP and GP are not suitable for
perturbing big data and data streams. DC is effective in perturbing big data, but SEAL performs
better by providing better efficiency and utility.
Table 4: Scalability results (in seconds) of the three methods for high dimensional data.
Dataset RP GP DC (k=10,000) SEAL (ws=10,000)
HPDS NC within 100h NC within 100h 526.1168 97.8238
HIDS NC within 100h NC within 100h 6.42E+03 1.02E+03
12NC: Did not converge
5.2.8. Performance on data streams
We checked the performance of SEAL on data streams with regard to (i) classification accuracy
and (ii) Minimum STD(D −Dp). The latter provides evidence to the minimum guarantee of attack
resistance provided under a particular instance of perturbation. As shown in Figure 9a, the clas-
sification accuracy of SEAL increases with increasing buffer size. This property is valuable for the
perturbation of infinitely growing data streams generated by systems such as smart cyber-physical
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systems. The figure indicates that when a data stream grows infinitely, the use of smaller window sizes
would negatively affect the utility of the perturbed data. When the window size is large, the utility
of the perturbed data is closer to the utility of the original data stream. We can also notice that DC
performs poorly in terms of classification accuracy compared to SEAL. It was previously noticed that
DC works well only for tiny buffer sizes such as 5 or 10 [70]. However, according to Figure 9b, the
minimum guarantee of attack resistance drops when the buffer size decreases, which restricts the use
of DC with smaller buffer sizes. According to Figure 9b, however, SEAL still provides a consistent
minimum guarantee of attack resistance, which allows SEAL to be used with any suitable buffer size.
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Figure 9: Dynamics of classification accuracy and the minimum STD(D-Dp) against increasing buffer size. During
the experiments, the privacy budget () was maintained at 1. The minimum STD(D − Dp) represents the minimum
(attribute) value of the standard deviation of the difference between the normalized attributes of the original data (LRDS
dataset) and the perturbed data. The classification accuracy was obtained by classifying each perturbed datasets using
the J48 classification algorithm.
6. Discussion
The proposed privacy-preserving mechanism (named SEAL) for big data and data streams performs
data perturbation based on Chebyshev polynomial interpolation and the application of a Laplacian
mechanism for noise addition. SEAL uses the first four orders of Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind
for the polynomial interpolation of a particular dataset. Although Legendre polynomials would offer
a better approximation of the original data during interpolation, Chebyshev polynomials are simpler
to calculate and provide improved privacy; a higher interpolation error, i.e. increased deviation from
the original data would intuitively provide greater privacy than Legendre polynomials. Moreover, we
intend to maintain the spatial arrangement of the original data, and this requirement is fully satisfied
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by Chebyshev interpolation. During the interpolation, SEAL adds calibrated noise using the Laplacian
mechanism to introduce randomization, and henceforth privacy, to the perturbed data. The Laplacian
noise allows the interpolation process to be performed with an anticipated random error for the root
mean squared error minimization. We follow the conventions of differential privacy for noise addition,
the introduction of noise is in accordance with the characteristic privacy budget . The privacy budget
() allows users (data curators) of SEAL to adjust the amount of noise. Smaller values of  (usually
less than 1 but greater than 0) add more noise to generate more randomization, whereas large values of
 add less noise and generate less randomization. The privacy budget is especially useful for multiple
data release, where the data curator can apply proper noise in the perturbation process in consecutive
data releases. SEAL’s ability to maintain the shape of the original data distribution after noise addition
is a clear advantage, and enables SEAL to provide convincingly higher utility than a standard local
differentially private algorithm. This characteristic may come at a price, and the privacy enforced by
a standard differentially private mechanism can be a little higher than that of SEAL.
The experimental results of SEAL show that it performs well on both static data and data streams.
We evaluated SEAL in terms of classification accuracy, attack resistance, time complexity, scalability,
and data stream performance. We tested each of these parameters using seven datasets, five classifi-
cation algorithms, and three attack methods. SEAL outperforms the comparable methods: RP, GP,
and DC in all these areas, proving that SEAL is an excellent choice for privacy preservation of data
produced by SCPS and related technologies. SEAL produces high utility perturbed data in terms of
classification accuracy, due to its ability to preserve the underlying characteristics such as the shape
of the original data distribution. Although we apply an extensive amount of noise by using a small 
value, SEAL still tries to maintain the shape of the original data. The experiments show that even
in extremely noisy perturbation environments, SEAL can provide higher utility compared to similar
perturbation mechanisms, as shown in Section 5.1. SEAL shows excellent resistance with regard to
data reconstruction attacks, proving that it offers excellent privacy. SEAL takes several steps to en-
hance the privacy of the perturbed data, namely (1) approximation through noisy interpolation, (2)
scaling/normalization, and (3) data shuffling. These three steps help it outperform the other, similar
perturbation mechanisms in terms of privacy.
In Section 5.1 we showed that SEAL has linear time complexity, O(n). This characteristic is crucial
for big data and data streams. The scalability experiments confirm that SEAL processes big datasets
and data streams very efficiently. As shown in Figure 9, SEAL also offers significantly better utility and
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attack resistance than data condensation. The amount of time spent by SEAL in processing one data
record is around 0.03 to 0.09 milliseconds, which means that SEAL can perturb approximately 11110
to 33330 records per second. We note that runtime speed depends on the computing environment, such
as CPU speed, memory speed, and disk IO speeds. The processing speed of SEAL in our experimental
setup suits many practical examples of data streams, e.g. Sense your City (CITY)13 and NYC Taxi
cab (TAXI)14 [90]. The results clearly demonstrate that SEAL is an efficient and reliable privacy
preserving mechanism for practical big data and data stream scenarios.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a solution for maintaining data privacy in large-scale data publishing
and analysis scenarios, which is becoming an important issue in various environments, such as smart
cyber-physical systems. We proposed a novel algorithm named SEAL to perturb data to maintain
data privacy. Linear time complexity (O(n)) of SEAL allows it to work efficiently with continuously
growing data streams and big data. Our experiments and comparisons indicate that SEAL produces
higher classification accuracy, efficiency, and scalability while preserving better privacy with higher
attack resistance than similar methods. The results prove that SEAL suits the dynamic environments
presented by smart cyber-physical environments very well. SEAL can be an effective privacy-preserving
mechanism for smart cyber-physical systems such as vehicles, grid, healthcare systems, and homes, as
it can effectively perturb continuous data streams generated by sensors monitoring an individual or
group of individuals and process them on the edge/fog devices before transmission to cloud systems
for further analysis.
The current configuration of SEAL does not allow distributed data perturbation, and it limits the
utility only to privacy-preserving data classification. A potential future extension of SEAL can address
a distributed perturbation scenario that would allow SEAL to perturb sensor outputs individually while
capturing the distinct latencies introduced by the sensors. SEAL could then combine the individually
perturbed data using the corresponding timestamps and latencies to produce the privacy-protected
data records. Further investigation on privacy parameter tuning would allow extended utility towards
other areas such as descriptive statistics.
13Sense your City is an urban environmental monitoring project that used crowd-sourcing to deploy sensors at 7 cities
across 3 continents in 2015 with about 12 sensors per city, and it generates 7000 messages/ sec.
14NYC Taxi cab (TAXI) produces a stream of smart transportation messages at the rate of 4000 messages/sec. The
messages arrive from 2M trips taken on 20,355 New York city taxis equipped with GPS in 2013.
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Appendix A. Chebyshev Polynomials of the First Kind
Definition 3. The Chebyshev polynomial Tn(x) of the first kind is a polynomial in x of degree n,
defined by the relation,
Tn(x) = cos nθ when x = cos θ (A.1)
From Equation A.1, we can deduce the first five (n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) Chebyshev polynomials using
Equation A.2 to Equation A.6, which are normalized such that Tn(1) = 1, and x ∈ [−1, 1].
T0(x) = 1 (A.2)
T1(x) = x (A.3)
T2(x) = 2x
2 − 1 (A.4)
T3(x) = 4x
3 − 3x (A.5)
T4(x) = 8x
4 − 8x2 + 1 (A.6)
Furthermore, we can represent any Chebyshev polynomial of the first kind using the recurrence
relation given in Equation A.7, where T0(x) = 1 and T1(x) = x.
Tn+1(x) = 2xTn(x)− Tn−1(x) (A.7)
Appendix B. Least Square Fitting
In least square fitting, vertical least squares fitting proceeds by finding the sum of squares of the
vertical derivations R2 (refer Equation B.1) of a set of n data points [75].
R2 ≡
∑[
f(xi, a1, a2, . . . , an)− yi
]2
(B.1)
Now, we can choose to minimize the quantity given in Equation B.2, which can be considered as an
average approximation error. This is also referred to as the root mean square error in approximating
(xi, yi) by a function f(xi, a1, a2, . . . , an).
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E =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
f(xi, a1, a2, . . . , an)− yi
]2
(B.2)
Let’s assume that f(x) is in a known class of functions, C. It can be shown that a function fˆ∗
which is most likely to equal to f will also minimize Equation B.3 among all functions fˆ(x) in C. This
is called the least squares approximation to the data (xi, yi).
E =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
fˆ(xi, a1, a2, . . . , an)− yi
]2
(B.3)
Minimizing E is equivalent to minimizing R2, although the minimum values will be different. Thus
we seek to minimize Equation B.1, which result in the condition given in Equation B.4 for i = 1, . . . , n.
∂(R2)
∂ai
= 0 (B.4)
Let’s consider f(x) = mx+ b for a linear fit. Thus we attempt to minimize Equation B.5, where b
and m are allowed to vary arbitrarily.
R2 =
n∑
i=1
[mxi + b− yi]2 (B.5)
Now, according to Equation B.4, the choices of b and m that minimize R2 satisfy, Equation B.6
and Equation B.7.
∂R2
∂b
= 0 (B.6)
∂R2
∂m
= 0 (B.7)
Equation B.6 and Equation B.7 result in Equation B.8 and Equation B.9.
∂R2
∂b
=
n∑
i=1
2 [mxi + b− yi] (B.8)
∂R2
∂m
=
n∑
i=1
2
[
mx2i + bxi − xiyi
]
(B.9)
From Equation B.8 and Equation B.9, we can generate the linear system shown in Equation B.10
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which can be represented by the matrix form shown in Equation B.11. Now, we can solve Equation
B.12, to find values of a and b to obtain the corresponding linear fit of f(x) = mx+ b.
nb+
 n∑
i=1
xi
m = n∑
i=1
yi n∑
i=1
xi
 b+
 n∑
i=1
x2i
m = n∑
i=1
xiyi
(B.10)
 n (∑ni=1 xi)(∑n
i=1 xi
) (∑n
i=1 x
2
i
)

 b
m
 =
 ∑ni=1 yi∑n
i=1 xiyi
 (B.11)
So,
 b
m
 =
 n (∑ni=1 xi)(∑n
i=1 xi
) (∑n
i=1 x
2
i
)

−1  ∑ni=1 yi∑n
i=1 xiyi
 (B.12)
Appendix C. Privacy-Preserving Polynomial Model Generation
Consider a dataset {(xi, yi)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and let
fˆ(x) = a1ϕ1(x) + a2ϕ2(x) + · · ·+ amϕm(x) (C.1)
where, a1, a2, . . . , am are coefficients and ϕ1(x), ϕ2(x), . . . , ϕm(x) are Chebeshev polynomials of first
kind,
ϕ1(x) = T0(x) = 1 (C.2)
ϕ2(x) = T1(x) = x (C.3)
ϕn(x) = Tn+1(x) = 2xTn(x)− Tn−1(x) (C.4)
Assume that the data {xi} are chosen from an interval [α, β]. The Chebyshev polynomials can be
modified as given in Equation C.5,
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ϕk(x) = Tk−1
(
2x− α− β
β − α
)
(C.5)
The approximated function fˆ of degree (m−1) can be given by Equation C.1, where the degree of (ϕk)
is k− 1. We will assume the interval [α, β] = [0, 1] and construct the model accordingly. According to
Equation C.6 when [α, β] = [0, 1], we get Equation C.6.
ϕk(x) = Tk−1
(
2x− α− β
β − α
)
= Tk−1(2x− 1) (C.6)
From Equation C.1 and Equation C.6 we have the following equations for m = 4.
ϕ1(x) = T0(2x− 1) = 1 (C.7)
ϕ2(x) = T1(2x− 1) = 2x− 1 (C.8)
ϕ3(x) = T2(2x− 1) = 8x2 − 8x+ 1 (C.9)
ϕ4(x) = T3(2x− 1) = 32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1 (C.10)
Equation C.12 defines fˆ(x) when m = 4.
fˆ(x) = a1ϕ1(x) + a2ϕ2(x) + a3ϕ3(x) + a4ϕ4(x) (C.11)
fˆ(x) = a1(1) + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) (C.12)
Let the actual input be yi, where i = 1 to n. The error of the approximated input can be determined
by Equation C.13.
ei = fˆ(xi)− yi (C.13)
We need to determine the values of a1, a2, a3, and a4 in such a way that the errors (ei) are small.
In order to determine the best values for a1, a2, a3, and a4, we use the root mean square error given in
Equation C.14.
E =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[
fˆ(xi)− yi
]2
(C.14)
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Let’s take the least squares fitting of fˆ(x) of the class of functions C which minimizes E as fˆ∗(x).
We can obtain fˆ∗(x) by minimizing E. Thus we seek to minimize M(a1, a2, a3, a4) which is given in
Equation C.15.
M(a1, a2, a3, a4) =
n∑
i=1
[
a1 + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1)− yi
]2
(C.15)
The values of a1, a2, a3, and a4 that minimize M(a1, a2, a3, a4) will satisfy the expressions given in
Equation C.16, Equation C.17, Equation C.18, and Equation C.19.
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a1
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)−yi]
2
)
∂a1
= 0 (C.16)
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a2
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)−yi]
2
)
∂a2
= 0 (C.17)
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a3
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)−yi]
2
)
∂a3
= 0 (C.18)
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a4
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)−yi]
2
)
∂a4
= 0 (C.19)
Appendix C.1. Utilizing differential privacy to introduce randomization to the approximation process
To decide the amount of noise, we have to determine the sensitivity of the noise addition process.
Given that we add the noise to the approximated values of ˆf(x), the sensitivity (∆f) can be defined
using Equation C.20, which is the maximum difference between the highest and the lowest possible
output values of ˆf(x). Since the input dataset is normalized within the bounds of 0 and 1, the minimum
possible input or output is 0 while the maximum possible input or output is 1. Therefore, we define
the sensitivity of the noise addition process to be 1.
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∆f = ‖max(yi)−min(yi+1)‖1 = (1− 0) = 1 (C.20)
Now we add random Laplacian to each expression given in Equations C.16 - C.19, according to
Equation C.21 with a sensitivity (∆f) of 1 and a privacy budget of  as shown in Equations C.22,
C.25, C.28 and C.31. In the process of adding the Laplacian noise, we choose Laplacian noise with a
position (location) of 0 as the idea is to keep the local minima of RMSE around 0 during the process of
interpolation. Here we try to randomize the process of obtaining the local minima of the mean squared
error to generate the value for the coefficients (a1, a2, a3, a4) with randomization. The differentially
private Laplacian mechanism can be represented by Equation C.21, where ∆f is the sensitivity of the
process, and  is the privacy budget.
PF (D) =

2∆f
e−
|x−F (D)|
∆F (C.21)
Equation C.22 shows the process of using the Laplacian mechanism to introduce noise to the
RMSE minimization of the polynomial interpolation process. Here, we try to introduce an error to the
partial derivative of Equation C.15 with respect to a1. By doing so, it guarantees that Equation C.22
contributes with an error to the process of finding the coefficients for a1, a2, a3, and a4, which is given
in Equation C.36. Since the sensitivity (∆f) of the noise addition process is 1, as defined in Equation
C.20, the scale (spread) of the Laplacian noise is 1/. We restrict the position (µ) of the Laplacian
noise at 0 as the goal is to achieve the global minima keeping the RMSE at 0 after the randomization.
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a1
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)+Lapi( ∆f )−yi]
2
)
∂a1
= 0 (C.22)
After applying the partial derivation on Equation C.22 with respect to a1, we can obtain Equation
C.23 which leads to obtaining Equation C.24.
∑n
i=1 2
[
a1 + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) + Lapi(∆f )− yi
]
= 0 (C.23)
Let’s use mij to denote the coefficients, and bi to represent the constants in the right hand side of
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the equal symbol in the factorised Equations C.24, C.27, C.30, and C.33.
a1 n︸︷︷︸
m11
+a2
2
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m12
+a3
8
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 8
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m13
+
a4
32
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 48
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 18
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m14
=
n∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
i=1
Lapi
(
∆f

)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b1
(C.24)
We repeat the same process of applying noise in Equation C.22 to apply noise to Equation C.17.
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a2
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)+Lapi( ∆f )−yi]
2
)
∂a2
= 0 (C.25)
After solving Equation C.25, we can obtain Equation C.26 which leads to obtaining Equation C.27.
∑n
i=1 2
[
a1 + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) + Lapi(∆f )− yi
]
(2xi − 1) = 0 (C.26)
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a1
2
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m21
+a2
4
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 4
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m22
+
a3
16
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 24
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 10
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m23
+
a4
64
 n∑
i=1
x4i
− 128
 n∑
i=1
x3i
+ 84
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 20
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m24
= 2
 n∑
i=1
xiyi
− n∑
i=1
yi −
2
 n∑
i=1
xiLapi
(
∆f

)− n∑
i=1
Lapi
(
∆f

)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b2
(C.27)
Similarly, we can obtain Equation C.30 and Equation C.33 after introducing the calibrated Lapla-
cian noise to Equation C.18 and Equation C.19 respectively.
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a3
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)+Lapi( ∆f )−yi]
2
)
∂a3
= 0 (C.28)
∑n
i=1 2
[
a1 + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) + Lapi(∆f )− yi
]
(8x2 − 8x+ 1) = 0 (C.29)
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a1
8
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 8
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m31
+a2
16
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 24
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 10
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m32
+
a3
64
 n∑
i=1
x4i
− 128
 n∑
i=1
x3i
+ 80
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 16
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m33
+
a4
256
 n∑
i=1
x5i
− 640
 n∑
i=1
x4i
+ 560
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 200
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 26
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m34
=
8
 n∑
i=1
x2i yi
− 8
 n∑
i=1
xiLapi
(
∆f

)+ n∑
i=1
yi−8
 n∑
i=1
x2iLapi
(
∆f

)− 8
 n∑
i=1
xiLapi
(
∆f

)+ n∑
i=1
Lapi
(
∆f

)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b3
(C.30)
∂M(a1,a2,a3,a4)
∂a4
=
∂
(∑n
i=1[a1+a2(2x−1)+a3(8x2−8x+1)+a4(32x3−48x2+18x−1)+Lapi( ∆f )−yi]
2
)
∂a4
= 0 (C.31)
∑n
i=1 2
[
a1 + a2(2x− 1) + a3(8x2 − 8x+ 1) + a4(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) + Lapi(∆f )− yi
]
(32x3 − 48x2 + 18x− 1) = 0 (C.32)
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a1
32
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 48
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 18
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m41
+
a2
64
 n∑
i=1
x4i
− 128
 n∑
i=1
x3i
+ 84
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 20
 n∑
i=1
xi
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m42
+
a3
256
 n∑
i=1
x5i
− 640
 n∑
i=1
x4i
+ 560
 n∑
i=1
x3i
− 200
 n∑
i=1
x2i
+ 26
 n∑
i=1
xi
− n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m43
+
a4
1024
 n∑
i=1
x6i
− 3072
 n∑
i=1
x5i
+ 3456
 n∑
i=1
x4i
− 1792
 n∑
i=1
x3i
+ 420
 n∑
i=1
x2i
− 36
 n∑
i=1
x
+ n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m44
=
32
 n∑
i=1
x3i yi
− 48
 n∑
i=1
x2i yi
+ 18
 n∑
i=1
xiyi
− n∑
i=1
yi−32
 n∑
i=1
x3iLapi
(
∆f

)− 48
 n∑
i=1
x2iLapi
(
∆f

)+ 18
 n∑
i=1
xiLapi
(
∆f

)− n∑
i=1
Lapi
(
∆f

)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b4
(C.33)
Let’s consider the coefficients (mij) and the constants (bi) in the Equations C.24, C.27, C.30, and
C.33. Using mij and bi we can form a linear system which can be denoted by Equation C.34.
CA = B (C.34)
Where,
C =

m11 m12 m13 m14
m21 m22 m23 m24
m31 m32 m33 m34
m41 m42 m43 m44

(C.35)
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A = [a1, a2, a3, a4]
T
(C.36)
B = [b1, b2, b3, b4]
T
(C.37)
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